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WHEN DRUG TESTING VIOLATES THE STUDENT
ATHLETE'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION
As drug testing in high school and college athletic programs becomes more
prevalent, so does the amount of litigation challenging the constitutionality of
these testing schemes. While these lawsuits sound in the varying claims of Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment encroachments, a constant
among these actions is that they all allege an invasion of privacy.
Using the recent case of Hill v NCAA' as a starting point, this article will
address the level of scrutiny courts apply to drug testing programs in the high
school and college athletic context, and assess which programs will pass con-
stitutional muster. More specifically, this article will focus on both the substan-
tive and procedural elements of a given testing scheme as well as the private or
governmental nature of the entity administering the testing program, and how
this affects the court's determination of the appropriate level of scrutiny.
L HILL V. NCAA: A WATERSHED IN PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
The Hill controversy arose when students at Stanford University sued the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).2 The students contended that
NCAA's drug testing program, which involved monitoring of urination, testing of
urine samples, and inquiries into a student athlete's medical history, violated
their right to privacy secured by article I, section 1 of the California Constitu-
tion.3 Stanford intervened in the suit and adopted the plaintiff students' posi-
tion.4 The superior court found the challenged testing provisions an invasion of
privacy and permanently enjoined their enforcement.5 The court of appeals up-
held the injunction.6 The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' holding and
upheld the NCAA's drug testing policy.7 By sustaining the constitutional validity
of the program, the court implemented a new level of scrutiny for private testing
entities, thereby developing the law of privacy as it applies to actions by private,
nongovernmental entities. The Hill court however, left untouched the level of
scrutiny courts have applied to testing procedures conducted by state/government
actors. In light of the Hill court's focus on what level of scrutiny a private
1. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 637
4. Id.
5. Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 619209.
6. 18 Cal. App. 4th 1290 (Cal. C. App. 1990).
7. Hill, 865 P.2d. at 633.
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actor's drug testing procedure must survive to pass constitutional muster, the
multiple cases which address the level of scrutiny to be applied when a govern-
ment entity is administering a given testing program, supplement rather than
clash with the novel standard enunciated in Hill. After Hill, the public or private
nature of the actor administering a drug testing scheme to student athletes be-
comes a threshold question for the courts when determining whether the program
can survive constitutional scrutiny.'
I. THE HILL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY STANDARD
In Hill, the California Supreme Court addressed three questions of first im-
pression: (1) Does the state Privacy Initiative govern conduct of private, nongov-
ernmental entities such as the NCAA?; (2) If yes, what legal standard is to be
applied in addressing alleged invasions of privacy?; (3) Under this standard, is
the NCAA's drug testing program a violation of the state constitutional right to
privacy?9 After answering the first question in the affirmative, the court turned
to the issue of what level of scrutiny should be applied to the allegedly intrusive
conduct of private entities.' °
The Hill court first established that the NCAA is a private organization, not a
government agency, and that the "relative strength and importance of privacy
norms and countervailing interests may differ in cases of private, as opposed to
government, action." In adopting a more relaxed standard of scrutiny for pri-
vate entity intrusions, the court cited the pervasiveness and wide-ranging effect
of government intrusion, the existence of a greater range of choices and alterna-
tives that confront an individual when dealing with private actors, and the pro-
tected associational interest a private citizen or organization has in choosing with
whom she or it will deal. 2 These factors together led the Hill court to apply a
less exacting standard than the "compelling interest" test applied by both the
lower court and courts in privacy actions brought against state universities. 3
III. INFORMATION AND AUTONOMY INTERESTS
Aside from adopting a lower level of scrutiny for private action, Hill's sig-
nificance also lies in its bifurcation of a student athlete's privacy interest. The
Hill court analyzed the plaintiff's "autonomy privacy" and "informational pri-
vacy" interests and how those interests were affected by the NCAA's testing
scheme before upholding it against the students' constitutional attack. 4 The
court defined the autonomy privacy interest as an interest in freedom from obser-
8. Id. at 641.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 642.
11. Id. at 655; see Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 762 (S.D.
Tex. 1989).
12. Hill, 865 P.2d at 656.
13. See, e.g., Derdeyn v. Univ. of Colo., 832 P.2d 1031 (Colo. App. 1991).
14. Hill, 865 P.2d at 657.
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vation in performing a function recognized by social norms as private. 5 The
informational privacy interest was defined as an interest in limiting disclosure of
confidential information about bodily condition.'6 The court held that the
NCAA's testing program implicated both types of privacy interests and would
therefore have to withstand constitutional scrutiny on both the autonomy and
informational level. 7
IV. ELEMENTS OF A PRIVACY CLAIM
While other cases have analyzed privacy actions directed against testing pro-
cedure on Fourth Amendment illegal search grounds", the Hill court instead
focused on the elements that a privacy claimant had to satisfy under the state
Privacy Initiative. The Privacy Initiative to the Califoria Constitution was adopt-
ed by the voters of California on November 7, 1972."9 This amendment supple-
mented article I, section 1 of the state constitution by adding privacy to the
section's catalog of inalienable rights!' The court held that in stating a cogniza-
ble privacy claim, a litigant must show the following: (1) A legally recognized
privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) a serious intru-
sion into that privacy interest.2! ' Once a claimant satisfied these elements, a de-
fendant could still prevail either by negating any of the three elements or by
pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion is justified
because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.'
The Hill court held that the NCAA's direct monitoring of an athlete's urina-
tion infringed upon a legally protected privacy interest? The athlete's right was
infringed both autonomously and informationally because direct monitoring in-
truded on a human bodily function that by law, and social custom, was generally
performed in private and without observers.24 The court similarly held that
questioning a student athlete on medication that he/she is currently ingesting or
has taken in the past sufficiently impeded a student athlete's informational priva-
cy interest.' After establishing that plaintiffs had asserted a legally protected
privacy interest, the court examined the remaining elements as they impacted
both the plaintiffs' autonomy and informational privacy interests. 6 In address-
ing the plaintiff's autonomy interest, the court held that while an athlete did have
15. Id. at 657.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Schaill v. Tippecanoe, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
19. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
20. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art I, § 1 (emphasis added).
21. Hill, 865 P.2d at 656.
22. Id. at 657.
23. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
19951
3
Porvaznik: When Drug Testing Violates the Student Athlete's Right to Privacy
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being watched while urinating, this
expectation of privacy was greatly compromised in the context of intercollegiate
athletics." The Hill court also held that a plaintiff's informational privacy inter-
est was similarly diminished in the context of intercollegiate athletics." The
court stated that while a plaintiff's interest in the privacy of medical treatment
and medical information was indeed a protectible interest under the Privacy
Initiative, this interest was greatly relaxed in this context because organized and
supervised athletic competition presupposed a continuing exchange of otherwise
confidential information about the physical and medical condition of athletes'
The court bolstered its holding of a lessened informational privacy interest by
citing the fact that coaches, trainers, and team physicians all learn intimate de-
tails concerning a student athlete's bodily condition including bodily illnesses
and any medications ingested by the student athlete." In making the determina-
tion that athletes have a diminished expectation of both informational and auton-
omy privacy, the court cited the climate of "close regulation and scrutiny of the
physical fitness and bodily condition of student athletes."'" Further support for
this contention is found in cases addressing privacy claims in the high school
athletic drug testing context. 2 The crux of the diminished expectation of priva-
cy claim then is that given the frequent and intense monitoring of an athlete's
internal and external condition, some intrusion into otherwise inviolable areas
comes with the territory."
V. AUTONOMY PRIvAcY
The California Supreme Court held that the NCAA's challenged testing
scheme compromised an athlete's autonomy privacy interest in not being subject
to unduly intrusive testing procedures. 4 The Court determined that in spite of
the diminished expectation of privacy inherent in the athletic context, the
NCAA's procedure of directly monitoring a student athlete was acutely intrusive
and the NCAA's concomitant probing the student for information relating to
ingested medications satisfied the serious invasion of privacy element." Having
recognized that the claimants had satisfied the reasonable expectation test (albeit
a relaxed one) and the serious intrusion test, the burden shifted to the NCAA to
show that its actions were justified by one or more countervailing interests. As
the court explained, legitimate competing interests derive from the "legally au-
thorized and socially beneficial activities of government and private entities ...
27. Id. at 658.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 664.
30. Id. at 664-65.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Schaill v. Tippecanoe, 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the "com-
munal undress" nature of athletics).
33. Hill, 865 P.2d at 637.
34. Id. at 633.
35. Id. at 659.
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[t]heir relative importance is determined by their proximity to the central func-
tions of a particular public or private enterprise."36 The asserted countervailing
interests in Hill were: (1) safeguarding the integrity of intercollegiate athletic
competition; and (2) protecting the health and safety of student athletes.37
In analyzing whether the NCAA's asserted interests trumped the plaintiffs'
privacy claims, the court first noted that since neither Congress nor the Legis-
lature had seen fit to interfere with the NCAA's rule-making authority, they were
compelled to view the NCAA's motives and objectives with presumptive validi-
ty.3" Noting that the central purpose of the NCAA was to promote competitive
athletic events conducted pursuant to its rules enacted by its membership, the
court applied a type of rational basis scrutiny.39 The court held that the NCAA's
asserted interest in ensuring a "level playing field" was sufficient justification for
the intrusive testing procedure.' The court's holding on this issue was further
bolstered by extensive expert testimony which evidenced a causal link between
drug use and artificially enhanced performance in those athletes using drugs,
particularly steroids.4' In validating the NCAA's asserted interest in promot-
ing the health and safety of its member athletes, the court stated that since the
NCAA effectively created athletic-related risks by sponsoring intercollegiate
athletics, they had an affirmative duty to protect those participating in intercolle-
giate athletics.42 The court found added impetus for this holding in the fact that
the NCAA's interest in safety existed not only for the benefit of the drug using
athlete but also for the innocent athlete and anyone else who might be injured by
a drug user.43 Just as the court enunciated no clear standard of scrutiny when
passing on the NCAA's fair competition interest, they were equally cryptic with
regard to the health/safety interest stating, "the NCAA has a significant interest
in conducting a testing program"' However, what is clear is that the level of
scrutiny employed did not rise to the level of a compelling interest or strict scru-
tiny standard.
VI. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
The Hill court also upheld the NCAA testing scheme against the informational
privacy interest implicated by the scheme.' In addressing the reasonable expec-
tation claim, the court stated that because athletes regularly share their medical
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 659.
40. Id. "Mhe NCAA's decision to enforce a ban on the use of drugs by means of a drug testing
program is reasonably calculated to further its legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of inter-
collegiate athletic competition." Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 661.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 665.
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conditions with coaches, trainers, and team physicians, the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that sharing similar information with the NCAA presents any greater
risk to privacy interests.' The Hill court also held that the athlete's diminished
expectation of privacy with respect to revealing medical data engendered an
analogous intrusion into that privacy interest.47 The court reasoned that since
questions relating to medications are routinely asked of student athletes, the
information which the NCAA sought to elicit here could hardly be regarded as a
serious intrusion.' Finally, the court applied what appeared to be a rational ba-
sis test in upholding the NCAA's competing interest of ensuring accurate drug
test results as justification for its information-gathering procedures.49
The Hill court noted that a prime source of error in both the plaintiffs plea-
dings and the trial court's ruling was imposing on the NCAA the burden of
showing that there were no less invasive alternatives than the testing program
employed s° The court summarily disposed of this contention by stating that a
defendant only has the burden of proving no less intrusive alternatives in situa-
tions which involve "clear invasions of central, autonomy-based privacy rights,
particularly in the areas of free expression and association, procreation, or gov-
ernment-provided benefits in areas of basic human need"; or where a privacy
action is directed against intrusive government conduct rather than private volun-
tary organizations.5 '
Hill is instructive in that it addresses the interest necessary to justify the inva-
sive procedure of direct monitoring of an athlete's urinating habits. s2 This pro-
cess of direct monitoring survived the court's scrutiny because the NCAA ad-
duced evidence that urine samples were subject to tampering and in fact had
been tampered with by athletes in the past and no evidence was brought by
plaintiff to suggest that any less intrusive procedure could ensure the same level
of testing accuracy as direct monitoring. 3
VII. PosT-HILL PRIVACY ACTIONS
Any attempt at forecasting how privacy jurisprudence will evolve in the wake
of Hill is mere speculation. Hill does however seem to firmly establish that when
a private entity is imposing a testing procedure which implicates privacy inter-
ests, the court will apply a lower level of scrutiny than the strict standard applied
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 666. The court stated that, "[t]he NCAA's information-gathering procedure is a method
reasonably calculated to further its interests in enforcing a ban on the ingestion of specified substanc-
es in order to secure fair competition and the health and safety of athletes participating in its pro-
grams." Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 663.
51. Id.
52. The court explained that "[tihe closest question presented by this case concerns the method
used by the NCAA to monitor athletes as they provide urine samples." Id. at 664.
53. Id.
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against state/public actors. 4 A court will also note the volitional nature of the
activity at issue as well as whether or not a claimant was provided notice of the
manner in which the testing scheme would be administered. If the notice and
voluntariness tests are met and the private entity can assert "legitimate" or "im-
portant" interests as justification for their allegedly intrusive conduct, then a
plaintiffs prospects of enjoining the private actor's conduct are negligible.55
VIII. DRUG TESTING IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS
While Hill is arguably a watershed decision in privacy law as applied to pri-
vate actors, the decision has little effect on drug testing in the high school con-
text. An important case addressing drug testing in the high school athletic con-
text is Schaill v. Tippecanoe.6 In Schaill, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held against a Fourth Amendment claim a school's requirement that interscholas-
tic athletes consent to random urinalysis testing to be eligible to compete in
interscholastic sports.57 Although the court never specifically said which level of
scrutiny they were applying, inferences reasonably drawn from the opinion show
that a stricter level of scrutiny than that applied in Hill was used. The Schaill
court first noted that in the athletic context, there is a diminished expectation of
privacy." From that premise the court held that the government interest in the
program must still be "weighty" and that less intrusive options for serving the
government's ends had been exhausted. 9 In holding that the testing procedure
at issue was constitutionally sound, the court pointed to the fact that the school
system's testing program involved no direct monitoring of urination.' Thus, by
implication the court seemed to be suggesting that if direct monitoring of urina-
tion were used as part of the testing program, it likely would have intensified the
court's scrutiny of the school's testing program. The Schaill court also pointed to
the consent form which students had to sign informing them of the program.'
The court felt that this consent form fully notified the student athletes of what
was going to transpire and further mitigated the intrusiveness of the school's
testing program.62
If Schaill left open the question of what level of scrutiny should be employed
in a high school drug testing context, Acton v. Vernonia63 unequivocally an-
54. See Derdeyn, 832 P.2d at 1034 (The court enjoined a public university from continuing its
mandatory drug testing program on the ground that the university's interest in securing a drug-free
athletic progran was not a compelling state interest which justified its collection and testing of urine
as part of its drug testing program).
55. Hill, 865 P.2d at 667.
56. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1309.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1318.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court stated that "[tlhe invasion of privacy is therefore not nearly as severe as would
be the case if the monitor were required to observe the subject in the act of urination." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1320.
63. 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ore. 1992).
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swered the question by adopting a "compelling need" standard. In Vernonia, the
court upheld a school district's drug testing policy of student athletes against a
Fourth Amendment illegal search claim.' The court held that since the district
had no individualized suspicion for testing the students, they had to demonstrate
a compelling need to justify the program.' There were several factors which
influenced the court's decision to sustain the program against constitutional at-
tack. One factor was the evidence cited by the school board which convincingly
showed a link between drug use and concomitant danger to the athlete.' An-
other important consideration which influenced the court's holding was the fact
that the school board administering the testing program did not undertake direct
monitoring of urination.67 Again, this implies that direct observation of urination
in the public high school athletic context is unlikely to survive constitutional
scrutiny. A final factor in the court's analysis was the evidence showing that
alternatives to random testing like education had been attempted unsuccessful-
ly.' Finally, the court held that substantial deference should be given to school
administrators in matters relating to safety and discipline.'
A case reaching a different result in the high school drug testing context is
Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District." In
Brooks, the district court held unconstitutional a school district's drug testing
program which consisted of urinalysis testing without individualized suspicion of
students in grades seven through 12 who were not only participating in athletics
but also in extra-curricular activities.7' The Brooks court stressed that in the
absence of individualized suspicion, the state testing actor would have to justify
the program with reference to "special interests."'72 The court held that special
interests which would be required to justify this program would include: (1)
evidence that participants in extra-curricular activities are more likely to use
drugs than non-participants; and (2) evidence that drug use by participants inter-
fered with the school's educational mission more seriously than drug use by non-
participants.73 Since the school district offered no such evidence, the court
found an absence of special interests justifying such a program.74
Another basis upon which the court struck down the challenged testing
scheme in Brooks was the fact that it applied to non-athletes who nevertheless
sought to engage in extracurricular activity.75 As the court explained, this com-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1363.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court emphasized that "[this] subtle approach not only failed, but seemed to cause
further disruptions." Id.
69. Id.
70. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 764.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
[Vol. V: 173
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prised over half the student body! 6 While the program upheld in Vernonia in-
volved extensive testing of a large amount of people, the dispositive factor seems
to be that students who are not participating in athletics but are involved in other
activities, are being tested in Brooks. In light of this fact, students whose expec-
tations of privacy are not diminished are still being subjected to this drug testing
procedure.
The Brooks court also implemented a requirement that the testing program
have likely prospects of accomplishing its asserted goals.7 The court deter-
mined that the school district's asserted goals of preventing drug-impaired stu-
dents from extra-curricular participation and deterrence from drug use were too
remote; the lax testing procedures were in no way a measure of present impair-
ment; and the consequences of a positive test result, foregoing extra-curricular
activities, was not severe enough to serve as a deterrent to drug use.78
CONCLUSION
Both Hill and the cases in which public high school drug testing programs
have been constitutionally challenged have predictive value for future cases chal-
lenging these programs. Hill stands for the firm proposition that when a testing
body is private rather than public/governmental, the court will apply a relaxed
intermediate level of scrutiny even if the challenged scheme severely intrudes
into both autonomous and informational spheres of privacy.79 In contrast, many
high school cases are in agreement that the level of court scrutiny which a public
high school testing program must survive is strict or compelling."0 To satisfy
this burden, the state actor must show that the objective furthered by the testing
program is indeed compelling. Schaill and Vernonia suggest that the compelling
interest standard is met when the goal of a testing program is to ensure the safe-
ty of a student athlete and to maintain discipline and order.8" Vernonia also sug-
gests that deference should be given to school officials' determinations concern-
ing discipline and safety.82 Brooks holds that when a testing program subjects to
testing non-athletes whose privacy expectations remain intact, the program is
likely to be struck down. 3 Brooks also adds the requirement that a state testing
actor who seeks to test students who do not have a diminished privacy interest,
produce evidence which convincingly shows that the challenged program is like-
ly to accomplish its asserted goal(s).8 4 In accordance with the compelling scruti-
ny courts are likely to apply in the high school athletic context, future courts will
likely look to whether a state testing body has exhausted all less intrusive meth-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 765.
78. Id.
79. Hill, 865 P.2d at 633.
80. See, e.g., Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ore. 1992).
81. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1309; Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1354.
82. Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1363.
83. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 764.
84. Id. at 765.
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ods of achieving its objectives. Schaill and Vernonia are instructive on this point
as both cases imply that direct monitoring of urination will constitute such an
egregious invasion into an athlete's sphere of privacy that no countervailing
interest will justify the invasion. 5
Paul Porvaznik
85. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1309; Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1354.
[Vol. V:173
10
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol5/iss1/9
